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Outsourcing Covert Activities
Laura A. Dickinson*
Over the past decade, the United States has radically shifted the way it
projects its power overseas. Instead of using full-time employees of foreign
affairs agencies to implement its policies, the government now deploys a
wide range of contractors and grantees, hired by both for-profit and nonprofit entities. Thus, while traditionally we relied on diplomats, spies, and
soldiers to protect and promote our interests abroad, increasingly we have
turned to hired guns. Contrast the first Gulf War to later conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan. During the Gulf War the ratio of contractors to troops
was 1 to 100; now, with approximately 260,000 contractors working for the
State Department, Department of Defense (DoD), and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) in Iraq and Afghanistan, that ratio has
1
often exceeded 1 to 1. To be sure, U.S. history is rich with examples of
contractors; the privateers of the Revolutionary period are a case in point.
But our current turn to privatized labor does reflect a new trend, spurred by
the post-Cold War decline of the standing military and the elimination of
the draft, supported by the public’s faith (not always backed up by data)
that the private sector can perform work more efficiently than government
employees, and fueled by the exigencies of the war on terror in the
2
aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Many of these modern
contractors perform logistics functions, such as delivering meals to troops
or cleaning latrines on the battlefield. Others guard diplomats, convoys,
and military bases. But contractors have also gathered intelligence,
interrogated detainees, and engaged in tactical maneuvers, sometimes under
circumstances involving hostile fire.
All of this outsourcing tests our commitment not to contract out core
governmental functions. Indeed, while the United States officially does not
3
allow security contractors to engage in military action, many contractors
have tangled with foreign populations in ways that look very much like
combat. For example, in a notorious 2007 incident in Baghdad’s Nisour
* Oswald Symister Colclough Research Professor of Law, The George Washington
University Law School.
1. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, TRANSFORMING
WARTIME CONTRACTING: CONTROLLING COSTS, REDUCING RISKS 20 (2011) (final report to
Congress), available at http://www.whs.mil/library/Reports/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf.
2. For a more thorough account of the forces spurring the growing use of foreign
affairs contractors, see LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE, 23-39 (2011).
3. See, e.g., Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter 11-01, Performance
of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56227, 56229 (Sept. 12,
2011) (adding . . . “[a]ll combat” and “security operations in certain situations connected
with combat or potential combat” to the “illustrative list of inherently governmental
functions”).
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Square, security guards employed by the firm then known as Blackwater,
under contract with the U.S. government, fired into a crowd and killed
civilians. Elsewhere, contract interrogators hired by the Department of the
Interior actually supervised uniformed military police officers who harshly
4
questioned and abused detainees at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison. And while
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DoD have now formally banned
5
the use of contract interrogators, and DoD has outlawed intelligence
6
gathering by contractors, the lines appear to be blurred on the ground.
Indeed, even after the DoD ban, former intelligence operative Duane
Clarridge reportedly established a private network of spies and provided
7
information gathered by these agents to the U.S. government.
The ever-expanding use of contractors threatens core public values
because the mechanisms of accountability and oversight that the United
States has generally used to curb abuses by government employees do not
translate well to contractors. Not all contractors are bad apples, of course,
8
and over 1,350 have died protecting U.S. interests in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Yet outsourcing as it is currently practiced threatens core commitments not
to use torture and to respect the human dignity of individuals overseas, or
the commitment to use force in a limited fashion that does not target
civilians, or the commitment to have some degree of transparency and
public participation in decisions to pursue aggressive activities abroad. For
example, although the soldiers who abused Abu Ghraib prisoners faced
courts-martial and were punished for their roles in the abuse, no contractors
have been held accountable in that instance. Jurisdictional loopholes in our
criminal law, combined with weak enforcement mechanisms and limited
evidence gathering capabilities, have enabled them to escape scrutiny.
Criminal proceedings against the Blackwater guards involved in the Nisour
9
Square incident have also met with difficulties.
Government privatization of covert activities is of particular concern.
To be sure, reining in the excesses of government actors engaged in covert
operations is a challenge even without outsourcing. This is because it is
much harder to gather information about such activities, regardless of
4. GEORGE R. FAY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY
205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 50-51 (2004), available at http://www.cbc.ca/
news/background/iraq/pdf/fay_report20040825.pdf.
5. FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. 110-84, §1038 (2009);
Siobhan Gorman, CIA Bans Interrogations by Outside Contractors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10,
2009, at A3; DFARS 237.173 (2010). The statute does allow the agencies to waive the ban
in the interest of national security.
6. Mark Mazzetti, Former Spy with Agenda Operates a Private C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2011, at A1.
7. Id.
8. Steven L. Schooner, Why Contractor Deaths Matter, 38 PARAMETERS 78, 78
(2008).
9. For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see DICKINSON, supra note 2, at
40-68.
AND
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whether they are carried out by government employees or by contractors.
And the tools of oversight and accountability we might deploy to control
covert actors are especially limited because of the secrecy that these kinds
of operations demand. Increased oversight by Congress and the general
public through enhanced transparency laws such as an expanded Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA), greater whistleblower protections, and agency
reporting, may often be impractical.
Yet reforms are possible, and indeed critical, if we care about
preserving core public values in the arena of covert operations. History
tells us that we should care about preserving those values, both because
covert operations can run amok without adequate accountability and
because effective oversight can actually improve the intelligence gathering
function itself. In my recent book, Outsourcing War and Peace, I lay out a
reform agenda for increasing oversight and accountability of private
contractors performing a range of military, security, and broader foreign
10
affairs functions.
While not all of these proposals are pertinent to
contractors performing covert activities, many can be deployed in the
intelligence context. This essay will briefly outline how these reforms
might apply to the contracting out of covert operations.
Before doing so, however, I should describe three assumptions
underlying my discussion. First, I start from the premise that we should
remain committed to certain core public values, such as the protection of
human dignity, even as we promote our security interests abroad. These
core values are reflected, for example, in our adherence to the international
treaty prohibiting torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
They are likewise reflected in our adherence to the Geneva Conventions
and our commitment to protect civilians during armed conflict. We might
sometimes have disputes about where to draw the line, but we should be
able to agree that some lines may not be crossed. And, as already
discussed, these lines both protect our values and also are likely to
contribute to more effective operations. Yet, to the extent that there are
some who wish to challenge whether any constraints should limit the scope
of our covert operations, I will not engage that debate here.
Second, I assume that another core value we share consists of some
degree of public participation in the decisions about how we use our covert
actors overseas. National security may require secrecy for these operations
to be successful, but I assume that we want some measure of public
engagement in the decisionmaking about how we prosecute these activities,
as well as some measure of transparency, though again we might disagree
about where to draw the line. Covert operations and public engagement are
not incompatible. Some “covert” operations, for example, are reported in
the press.
10.

See DICKINSON, supra note 2.
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Third, I assume that outsourcing, even of covert operations, is here to
stay, at least for a long time to come. Again, we may draw lines, such as
with respect to offensive combat and interrogation, but for a variety of
political reasons, outsourcing is not likely to disappear any time soon. Most
notably, a political culture that assumes the efficiency of the private sector
(without necessarily accumulating data to prove it) makes the hiring of
contract workers much easier politically than expanding the number of
government employees or uniformed soldiers. Providing contracts to
private employees serves the illusion that “government is not big” or “is
getting smaller.” As a consequence, the starting point for my argument is
that we should accept the reality of outsourcing and seek to control it better.
We are in a brave new world, and we cannot ignore it. Accordingly, our
best way forward is not to rail against the use of contractors in toto, but to
provide better accountability for the contractors upon whom we
increasingly rely.
A recent example illustrates why better accountability would be useful,
both strategically and morally. In February of 2011 Pakistani officials
11
arrested Raymond Davis after he killed two men on a street in Lahore.
Although American officials assert that Davis acted in self-defense when
the men attacked him, the Pakistani press, outraged, accused the United
States of letting its contract spies run amok on Pakistani soil. They alleged
that the man was an employee of Blackwater. U.S. authorities initially
denied that he was a contractor, claiming that Davis was a consular
employee and therefore entitled to some form of immunity in Pakistani
courts. Eventually they conceded that Davis was in fact a CIA contractor,
and indeed an employee of Blackwater, confirming the Pakistanis’ worst
12
fears.
Significantly, one of the core concerns of the Pakistanis was the lack of
accountability for U.S. contractors operating overseas. Whether or not
Davis acted inappropriately, there has not been a good track record of
accountability. To be sure, there have been a few cases in which U.S.
courts have convicted contractors for abuse. For example, in August 2006
David Passaro, a contractor, was convicted in the U.S. District Court for
13
North Carolina for abusing an Afghan detainee during an interrogation.
But other proceedings have been less successful. As noted above, the case
against the Blackwater guards implicated in the Nisour Square incident has
faced numerous difficulties, and no contractors were held accountable for
their role at Abu Ghraib.
11. Mark Mazetti, Ashley Parker, Jane Perlez & Eric Schmitt, American Held in
Pakistan Worked with C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Feb, 22, 2011, at A1.
12. Id. Blackwater has changed its name to Xe Services, and more recently it adopted
the name Academi. The Security Contractor Formerly Known as Blackwater Changes Its
Name Again, BUSINESS INSIDER, Dec. 12, 2011.
13. Dafna Linzer & Josh White, Ex-Contractor Guilty of Assaulting Detaineee, WASH.
POST, Aug. 18, 2006, at A08.
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This lack of accountability is an important part of the way host nations
such as Pakistan perceive contractors. Host nation citizens routinely
attribute the actions of contractors to the U.S. government. As one military
lawyer I interviewed for my book noted, “If an incident [in which a
contractor used force] occurred in our area,” it was to the “contractor’s
14
advantage to fly under the radar.” But it was “[the military’s] job to
15
respond, to take the flak from families.” The “military has to clean it up,
16
conduct an investigation.” Thus, the United States is not deemed any less
responsible just because it has deployed contractors rather than soldiers.
Yet the lack of oversight for contractors is evident to all – and so the use of
contractors is viewed as an effort to flout existing rules and norms. A more
effective system of accountability would send a strong signal to host nations
that contractors, like government employees, must adhere to the core
commitments of the United States.
So how can we provide better oversight regarding contractors, in
particular those who are engaged in covert operations? We should focus on
four mechanisms of accountability and constraint. The first is legal
accountability, the extent to which private contractors might be amenable to
criminal prosecution or civil suit in international or domestic legal forums.
There are multiple immunity and jurisdictional issues that limit the
possibilities for contractor accountability. Nonetheless, though far from
perfect, some legal avenues do exist, at least in theory, to hold contractors
accountable through either domestic criminal prosecutions or civil suits.
Thus, it would be a mistake to assume that privatization removes the
possibility of legal accountability altogether. Indeed, while significant gaps
persist in existing criminal and civil law, the problem of legal
accountability is not so much a deficiency of law on the books as it is a
failure of law in action. Rather than focusing on writing new laws, we
17
should devote our energy to redesigning our institutions of enforcement.
Nevertheless, because legal accountability is weak in the foreign affairs
context with regard to either state or non-state actors, alternative
mechanisms of control are essential. A second mechanism, therefore, is
contractual accountability and constraint. Contractual terms might
explicitly extend the norms of public international law to contractors
(thereby addressing any potential “state action” problems in international
14. DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 178.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. For example, a dedicated unit could be established within the Department of
Justice, combined with a team of FBI agents trained to work in conflict zones and
collaborate with military investigators and state department officials. This would establish a
cadre of people with the expertise to build these very difficult cases. Such a reform, while
perhaps not a complete solution, could go a long way toward curing some of the problems
we’ve seen in the past. See DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 63.
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law), provide more specific terms (such as training requirements and
performance benchmarks), assure better monitoring and oversight, require
contractors to submit to outside accreditation by third-party organizations,
and offer better enforcement mechanisms, such as third-party beneficiary
18
suits.
Public participation is a third mechanism of accountability and
constraint, which, while less available when dealing with covert activities,
may nonetheless be relevant to some degree. Here I refer to public
participation within the United States as well as within the host nation. The
latter is complicated by the fact that the communities directly affected will
often have only minimal ability to influence the distant government
overseeing the contract or its polity. Thus, it is especially important to build
into the privatized relationship mechanisms that will require contractors to
consult with affected populations concerning the design of projects and to
offer opportunities for feedback or the filing of grievances concerning
implementation.
Finally, organizational constraints are important to consider. In my
book, I use organizational theory to explore ways that government and
private entities (both for-profit and not-for-profit) develop internal
organizational structures and norms of behavior that render them more or
less likely to conform to various public law values. For example, in the
years following Vietnam, the U.S. military built a culture of respect for the
values embedded in international law, including those rules addressing the
treatment of detainees and limits on the use of force during armed conflict.
The military achieved this goal in part through organizational structure, by
19
increasing the role and authority of uniformed judge advocates in the field.
And despite actions by civilian officials within the George W. Bush
administration aimed at weakening that commitment post September 11,
2001, it is significant that the uniformed leadership persisted in its efforts to
protect those values.
Yet the use of private military contractors – especially interrogators and
security contractors – has effectively weakened that culture on the ground,
leading to abuses such as those at Abu Ghraib. Interviews with uniformed
judge advocates about the growing role of security contractors shows how
the rise of such contractors threatens the judge advocates’ ability to protect
public values on the battlefield. Use of military contractors also muddies
command lines of authority in theater and creates conflicts between
18. Government contracts typically may be enforced only by the contractor (or a firm
that could have been awarded the contract) or the government. See, e.g., Scott v. United
States, 78 Fed. Cl. 151 (2007). Some commentators have suggested that suits brought by
third party beneficiaries to the contracts might be a possibility, and there have been some
examples of courts recognizing this theory in the health care privatization context. See, e.g.,
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 603, 608
(2000).
19. For a more detailed analysis, see DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 144-188.
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uniformed personnel and their higher paid private counterparts. Finally, the
contract firms do not have the robust organizational infrastructure of the
U.S. military or the equivalent of judge advocates, who can help to
inculcate rule-of-law values within firms. Perhaps these are arguments
against outsourcing itself. Yet the power of organizational structure and
culture might also be harnessed as a mode of controlling private military
companies. Firms, even those engaged in covert operations, could be better
integrated into the military’s judge advocate system, for example if judge
advocates trained the contractors. Alternatively, firms might implement
organizational reforms that could mitigate some of the problems.
Let us now consider how these four mechanisms of accountability and
constraint might apply to contractors engaged in covert operations.
I. LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONSTRAINT
In the case of legal accountability, we ought to consider both
jurisdictional defects as well as enforcement issues. In both contexts,
reforms are relevant to contractors working in covert operations, whether
they are gathering intelligence, providing security, or performing some
other function. With respect to criminal accountability, in the case of
extreme abuse, lack of clarity about federal court jurisdiction over
extraterritorial acts has been a stumbling block. For example, the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) is the primary law that gives U.S.
courts the power to try contractors when they are accused of committing
20
serious abuses. However, MEJA does not explicitly govern contractors
who work for agencies other than the DoD, such as the State Department
21
contractors involved in the Nisour Square incident.
It is vital that
Congress close the jurisdictional gap, and efforts are underway to do so in
the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (CEJA), sponsored by Senator
Patrick Leahy, former Senator Edward Kaufman, and Representative David
22
Price, which is now pending in Congress.
One of the hurdles in enacting CEJA is apparently the concern among
the intelligence agencies, that, as drafted, the bill would give federal courts
jurisdiction over too broad a swath of federal crimes. Indeed, virtually any
federal crime a contractor commits overseas, even minor non-violent
crimes, would come within federal jurisdiction. This concern is particularly
relevant to covert operatives, whether contractors or government
employees. However, regardless of whether one agrees that such operatives

20. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. §§3261, 3267 (2006).
21. 18 U.S.C. §3267 (1)(A)(II)(ii) (2006) (extending jurisdiction only to those
contractors from other agencies whose “employment relates to supporting a Department of
Defense mission”).
22. S. 1145, 112th Cong. (2011).
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should have the leeway to engage in actions that would be minor federal
crimes in the United States, there is arguably scope for agreement that at
least some serious abuses should be subject to jurisdiction, and Congress
could delineate some narrower set of crimes, as it has done in proposed
23
legislation.
Alternatively, prosecutorial discretion to refrain from
prosecuting overly sensitive cases might serve as another safety valve.
Nevertheless, closing jurisdictional loopholes, while important, is not
sufficient. Indeed, even under the current jurisdictional scheme more
prosecutions could have been pursued, which implies both that we could be
doing a better job right now in holding contractors responsible for abuses
and that closing jurisdictional loopholes cannot be the only answer. For
example, in the case of David Passaro, federal prosecutors were able to
secure a conviction by using the Special Maritime and Territorial
Jurisdiction, which gives federal courts jurisdiction over crimes committed
overseas in certain types of facilities controlled by the U.S. government.
Because Passaro interrogated the subject in such a facility, the courts had
jurisdiction. Using the same approach, courts might also have exercised
jurisdiction over the contract interrogators at Abu Ghraib. Likewise,
prosecutors encountered jurisdictional and other difficulties in the Nisour
Square case, illustrating serious flaws in the current legal and regulatory
regime that governs contractors overseas. Although prosecutors initiated
proceedings against five Blackwater guards in December of 2008, a district
court judge threw out the case a year later. The court of appeals reinstated
the prosecution on April 22, 2011, so it seems set finally to go to trial, but
24
jurisdictional and other enforcement issues may resurface. Accordingly,
the lack of prosecution in these cases suggests problems beyond
jurisdiction.
Thus, we also need to restructure our institutions of enforcement to
build more expertise and set better incentives for pursuing these cases. For
many years, responsibility for contractor abuse cases lay with U.S.
Attorneys offices around the country, and lawyers there did not necessarily
see these cases as a high priority, or have the experience needed to
prosecute them successfully. We need a designated office within the
Department of Justice to focus on these types of cases, and we should
require the office to report on its efforts. Special expertise to handle such
cases is particularly significant in covert cases, when issues such as
“graymail” might arise. Graymail is a type of blackmail in which suspects
might threaten to disclose information that would put national security
interests at risk. Indeed, according to the prosecutor, graymail was an issue
in the Passaro case, and having an office with special expertise in handling
such security threats would likely help. At the same time, we need better
23. Id. §3273 (limiting federal jurisdiction to egregious crimes such as murder and
assault).
24. United States v. Slough, 641 F. 3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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25

evidence gathering in the field. It took two weeks for FBI investigators to
get to Nisour Square to gather information, and ultimately it was largely the
evidentiary problems that caused this case to fall apart. Thus, I support
CEJA’s provisions requiring theater investigative units to gather evidence
in cases of abuse.
II. USING CONTRACTUAL TERMS
Contractual terms can also be an important tool of accountability and
constraint. To begin with, contracts should explicitly require that
contractors obey norms and rules that implement public law values. For
example, terms of each agreement could identify relevant legal frameworks
and provide that private contractors must abide by applicable legal rules
within those frameworks. Similarly, contracts should provide for specific
training of contractors that would better enable contractors to abide by those
rules.
In a study I conducted of all of the publicly available Iraq contracts
several years into the U.S. engagement there, I concluded that the contracts
fell far short in these respects, particularly in comparison to state and local
privatization contracts for prison management, health care, and other
26
services. And even as of 2007, four years after the beginning of the Iraq
War and six years after the beginning of the conflict in Afghanistan, the
DoD and State Department had strikingly different contracting practices.
For example, a report produced by the Secretary of State’s Panel on
Personal Protective Services in Iraq observed after two weeks of on-theground interviews that security contractors in Iraq were operating “in an
environment that is chaotic, unsupervised, deficient in oversight and
27
accountability, and poorly coordinated.” Moreover, the report noted a lack
of “parallelism” between the State Department rules and those of the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) on the use of force by contracted security
in Iraq, and in particular urged the State Department to revise its rules to
clarify that “if an authorized employee must fire his/her weapon, he/she
must fire only aimed shots; fire with due regard for the safety of innocent
28
bystanders; and make every effort to avoid civilian casualties.”
Since then, the DoD and State Department have entered into a
29
Memorandum of Agreement to harmonize their approaches to standards
25.
26.
27.

See DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 59-60.
Id. at 69-101.
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE’S PANEL ON PERSONAL PROTECTIVE SERVICES
IN IRAQ 4 (2007)), available at http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/iraq/ State/94122.pdf. Panel
members included Eric J. Boswell, George A. Joulwan, J. Stapelton Roy, and Patrick F.
Kennedy.
28. Id. at 9.
29. Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the U.S. Dep’t of Def. and the U.S.
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for private security contractors as well as contract management more
broadly. This effort has earned the praise of watchdogs such as the
30
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Special Inspector
31
General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR).
Yet the fact that the rules
regarding the use of force for contractors were so different for so long is
troubling. In addition, the Memorandum of Agreement covers only security
contractors, not other contractors, such as covert operatives, translators, or
logistics contractors, who carry weapons for self-defense and who therefore
might use force. Moreover, the contract language remains relatively broad
and vague. More useful terms would refer to particular obligations under
international law, such as specific human rights or humanitarian law
treaties, as opposed to the general command to obey applicable law.
Provisions must also be made for increased contract monitoring, which
would help ensure an important additional check on abuses. Such
monitoring should include, to begin with, sufficient numbers of trained and
experienced government contracts monitors. In addition, other government
personnel who interact with contractors, such as commanders, uniformed
military personnel, or agency officials must understand contractors’ roles
and in some cases have their own oversight capability. Finally, government
ombudspersons – leaders of independent offices charged with providing
enhanced oversight – serve as an important supplement to contract
monitors. Thus, at a minimum, it is essential that government agencies
devote sufficient resources to ensure that these requirements are
implemented in a meaningful way. Contractual terms, such as mandatory
contractor self-evaluation and performance benchmarks, can increase the
impact of monitoring.
As with contractual language, both the George W. Bush administration
and now the Obama administration have also made some strides in
monitoring contracts. Agencies have improved contract monitoring to
some degree since the early days of the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Indeed, the GAO concluded in 2008 that the “DOD and the State
Department have improved oversight and coordination” of security
32
contractors. For example, in 2007 the DoD established a new unit, the
Armed Contractor Oversight Division, to monitor security contractors. This
division has improved tracking of serious incidents involving armed

Dep’t of State on USG Private Sec. Contractors (Dec. 5, 2007).
30. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REBUILDING IRAQ: DOD AND STATE
DEPARTMENT HAVE IMPROVED OVERSIGHT AND COORDINATION OF PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ, BUT FURTHER ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO SUSTAIN IMPROVEMENTS 4
(2008) [hereinafter REBUILDING IRAQ].
31. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION,
SIGIR 09-019, OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE PROCESSES FOR REPORTING, INVESTIGATING, AND
REMEDIATING SERIOUS INCIDENTS INVOLVING PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ 1-2
(2009).
32. REBUILDING IRAQ, supra note 30, at 1, 4, 9, 19.
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security contractors, and has increased accountability. Furthermore,
military units are now “more responsible for providing oversight” including
33
Thus,
“reporting and investigating as well as contract management.”
according to the GAO, on-the-ground military units are no longer working
in ignorance of contracts, or even worse, at cross-purposes with contract
monitors. And the State Department has increased oversight of security
contractors by placing diplomatic security agents in each security contractor
34
motorcade and has increased the number of government security agents.
Yet significant challenges remain. As recently as 2008, Jack Bell, then
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness),
emphasized that “faced with this unprecedented scale of dependence on
contractors, we have confronted major challenges associated with visibility,
integration, oversight, and management of a large contractor force working
alongside our deployed military personnel that, frankly, we were not
35
adequately prepared to address.” Indeed, even in praising the DoD and the
State Department for their increased contract monitoring, the GAO
questioned whether the agencies had enough personnel in place to be
effective. As the GAO put it, “It is not clear whether DOD can sustain this
36
increase [in staffing].” Indeed, according to the report, the Army “lacks
the leadership and military and civilian personnel to provide sufficient
37
contracting support to either expeditionary or peacetime missions.” In a
separate 2009 audit of the State Department security contracts with
Blackwater, the SIGIR found that the contract officer representatives
(CORs) for the contract were severely overtaxed: “[S]ince the COR duties
are collateral and are assigned to special agents who spend most of their
time planning and executing their own protective missions, the special
38
agents have little time for contract administration or monitoring.” These
reports strongly suggest that contract management remains a side job that
gets short shrift in the face of other, overwhelming duties. Even the DoD’s
recent commitment to hire twenty thousand new contract-monitoring

33. Id. at 4, 9.
34. Id.
35. The Hon. P. Jackson Bell, Deputy Under Sec’y of Def. (Logistics and Materiel
Readiness), U.S. Dep’t of Def., Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec.
and Gov't Affairs (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test
Bell080227.pdf.
36. REBUILDING IRAQ, supra note 30, at 4.
37. Id. at 16.
38. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE BROAD. BD. OF GOVERNORS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
& THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION (SIGIR), SIGIR09-21, AUD/IQO-09-16, JOINT AUDIT OF BLACKWATER CONTRACT AND TASK ORDERS FOR
WORLDWIDE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE SERVICES IN IRAQ 32 (2009).
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personnel by 2015, though a step in the right direction, is probably
insufficient given the huge growth in contract labor over the past decade.
Another contractual tool for promoting public law values is
accreditation. Independent organizations, often consisting of experts or
professionals in the field, can evaluate and rate private contractors.
Government authorities can then require that contractors receive certain
ratings. Or government entities or international institutions, such as the
United Nations, could develop accreditation regimes. For example, both
the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have supported what might
be termed an international accreditation process, sometimes referred to as
the Montreux Document, for private military and security contractors.
Initiated by the Swiss government and the International Committee of the
Red Cross, the process now includes a code of conduct and involves
participation by governments, industry, and civil society groups. The code
sets standards for practices such as vetting and training of military and
40
security firms.
Accreditation would also require establishment of a
grievance procedure and an auditing process, both of which are
contemplated in the code, though the precise grievance mechanism and
41
audit requirements remain to be worked out.
Finally, Congress or the relevant agencies could improve contract
enforcement. Currently, even in the domestic setting, generally only
government officials and contractors may enforce contract violations,
though Congress has provided for limited private enforcement against those
who have defrauded the government. Measures that would enhance
enforcement might include greater opportunities for third-party enforcement
actions in domestic courts, expanded whistleblower protections for
contractor employees, and privatized grievance procedures.
Many of these contractual reforms are relevant to the privatization of
covert activities. The need for more specific contractual terms regarding
training and the use of force, for example, applies equally to contract spies
as to contract security guards protecting military installations, although the
precise terms might vary depending on the nature of the particular
operation. Similarly, more and better trained oversight personnel, whether
in DoD or the CIA or other agencies, is critical. And inspectors general
should monitor and report on the activities of contractors engaged in covert
operations. If the publication of such reports would compromise national
security, transmission to congressional committees without broader public
disclosure is possible.

39. Elise Castelli, How DOD Will Add 20,000 Acquisition Officers, DEFENSE NEWS,
Apr. 13, 2009, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4035334.
40. International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, Nov. 9,
2010, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/
sede150311audcodeofconduct_/sede150311audcodeofconduct_en.pdf.
41. Id. at 3, 15-16.
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Accreditation is particularly relevant here. Firms hired by any
government agency to perform covert work ought to receive some sort of
pre-clearance or accreditation based on various benchmarks of quality. The
Montreux framework could be broadened to apply explicitly to firms
42
engaged in covert activities.
Expanding enforcement of contractual reforms in the case of privatized
covert activities may pose special challenges. Indeed, it is unlikely that
Congress will allow third party beneficiaries to challenge the terms even of
logistics contracts, let alone contracts involving covert operations. And
expansion of whistleblower protections is also problematic. But a
grievance mechanism within an accreditation regime such as the proposed
Montreux framework is a distinct possibility. Such a framework could
preserve some measure of secrecy while allowing for accountability.
III. TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Expanding transparency is generally not a viable form of accountability
and constraint for privatized covert activities. In Outsourcing War and
Peace I argue, for example, that an expansion of the FOIA, broader
whistleblower protections, and mandated disclosure of standard contractual
terms could help promote public participation by increasing the
transparency of the contracting process. I also argue that the agencies
should gather data on contractor abuses and report that data to Congress and
the public. Such reforms, while helpful in the case of security and logistics
contracting, are unrealistic in cases where secrecy of operations is critical to
protect U.S. interests.
Nonetheless, more limited disclosure of contractor activities in covert
operations is potentially workable. Thus, agencies might at least report on
such activities to congressional committees charged with keeping the
information secret. Such an inter-branch check on executive authority is
important, even if it does not entail broad public accounting.

42. The Montreux Document defines private military and security companies
(PMSCs) as “private business entities that provide military and/or security services,
irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in
particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings
and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and
advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.” Montreux Document,
International Committee of the Red Cross U.N. Document A/63/467-S/2008/636 (Oct. 8,
2009) Annex, available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/537/10/
pdf/N0853710.pdf?OpenElement.
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IV. INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CULTURE

Internal organizational compliance structure and the culture of
organizations – whether agencies or private firms – comprise another, often
overlooked mechanism of accountability and constraint. In Outsourcing
War and Peace, I first review studies of organizational structure and culture
in other settings, and then, through a series of interviews I conducted with
uniformed military lawyers, I examine internal structural and cultural
factors in the U.S. military that promote compliance with certain core
values. Specifically, I rely on a broad literature suggesting that the
existence of certain features within an organization, such as compliance
agents who are: (1) integrated with operational employees, (2) possess
strong commitments to core values, (3) have an independent hierarchy for
promotion, and (4) can invoke an internal sanctions regime, promotes
accountability and constraint.
The interviews I conducted with uniformed military lawyers – who can
be viewed as the compliance agents within the military – suggest the critical
role that these lawyers play on the battlefield, integrating public values into
military decisionmaking by training troops in the laws of war and advising
commanders on issues such as whether a particular targeting decision is a
“good shoot or a bad shoot.” Military lawyers, embedded with troops in
combat and consulting regularly with commanders, have internalized and
seek to operationalize the core values inscribed in the international law of
armed conflict, in particular the imposition of limits on the use of force.
They also have a somewhat independent hierarchy for promotion, which
depends on the assessments of more senior military lawyers as well as their
battlefield commanders. And they can encourage their commanders to
invoke a strong sanctions regime, the military justice system, when soldiers
cross the line and commit abuses. To be sure, the lawyers are not always
successful, and it would be simplistic to assume that the U.S. military
always obeys international law. But the stories these military lawyers tell
support the idea that the presence of lawyers on the battlefield can – at least
sometimes – produce military decisions that are more likely to comply with
43
international legal norms.
By contrast, contractors largely fall outside this organizational
accountability framework. While they may receive some training in the
rules regarding the use of force, that training does not typically include
updated advice on the battlefield about how the rules apply in specific
scenarios likely to arise. Contractors also do not receive ongoing
situational advice from military lawyers or even from private lawyers
employed by their firms. Finally, the accountability system that has applied
to troops has not, at least until recently, been extended to contractors. Thus,

43.

DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 144-188.
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many crucial, though subtle, mechanisms of compliance with public values
are significantly weakened in the privatization process.
One response to this problem is to give the uniformed lawyers more of
a role in advising contractors. They might do more training of contractors
authorized to use force and provide consultation or supervision in the field.
And they might take a more active role in recommending punishment from
within the military justice system for contractors accused of committing
abuses. Indeed, Congress enacted legislation several years ago that
44
expanded the power of military courts to try contractors. This approach is
potentially available for some categories of contractors engaging in covert
activities. Military lawyers might provide training to military contractors or
contractors from other agencies working with the military regarding the
applicable laws of war.
When contractors are engaging in activities outside conflict zones or are
not partnering with the military, this approach would be less feasible.
Nonetheless, an embedded oversight role for civilian lawyers is a
possibility. For example, CIA lawyers are involved in the clearance process
45
for drone attacks. Of course, it is unclear whether the CIA has inculcated
the same culture of respect for the rule of law that appears to be ingrained
within the uniformed military, or whether the CIA’s organizational
structures support an independent cadre of compliance agents, as we see in
the military context.
Nevertheless, embedding government lawyers is not the only possible
approach. Even for contractors conducting covert operations, we could
require contract firms to install internal accountability agents with a role
comparable to that of uniformed lawyers in the military. Such agents
should be responsible for training employees, monitoring their actions,
tracking abuses, and imposing sanctions in the case of such abuses.
Perhaps the decision by Academi (formerly Blackwater) to appoint former
Attorney General John Ashcroft as their lead ethics agent is a step in this
46
direction.
CONCLUSION
There are, of course, potential difficulties with all four mechanisms of
accountability and constraint described in this essay, whether the privatized
activities are covert or not, and a detailed discussion of implementation is

44. 10 U.S.C. §802(a)(10) (2006).
45. Tara Mckelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 2011, at 34.
46. Eyder Peralta, Ashcroft Joins Former Blackwater Firm as Head of Ethics
Committee, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (May 4, 2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2011/05/04/135991896/ashcroft-joins-former-blackwater-firm-as-head-of-ethicscommittee. See supra note 12.

13__DICKINSON_V10_010312 (CLEAN).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

536

2/9/2012 3:55 PM

JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:521

beyond the scope of this article. One overall objection that might be raised,
however, deserves a response here. It might be suggested that any reform
proposal to provide better accountability for contractors is inherently
unrealistic because one of the main reasons governments privatize is
precisely to avoid the kinds of constraints that I argue should be imposed.
Yet governments are not monolithic, and there are undoubtedly many
people within bureaucracies, such as contract monitors, who would
welcome (and lobby for) mechanisms that increase accountability. In
addition, legislatures sensitive to public opinion may be able to play an
increased oversight role, and NGOs and international organizations can
sometimes pressure states to adopt at least some of the approaches I have
discussed. Moreover, even when states fail to act, NGOs can take actions
on their own – such as adopting accreditation and rating schemes – that may
have a significant impact. And these efforts may occur domestically or
through transnational legal and political processes. Finally, once the focus
moves beyond simply trying to impose direct legal liability, governments
may be more willing to consider alternative contract language, internal
organizational structure, and public participation values in drafting and
awarding contracts in the first place. The problem is that neither policymakers nor scholars have sufficiently focused on privatization or the
alternative mechanisms of constraint that the privatized relationship opens
up.
Most importantly, while it is of course true that these various
mechanisms of constraint will not solve the problems posed by
privatization, either separately or in combination, it is not as if even nonprivatized foreign affairs activity is subject to sufficient mechanisms of
accountability or constraint. And in any event, given that foreign affairs
privatization is probably here to stay, those who care about human dignity,
public participation, and transparency will need to think creatively about a
variety of plausible means to constrain privatization. We will not be able to
simply resist the privatization trend altogether. In addition, once we seek to
constrain privatization, rather than eliminate it outright, we may find that
while outsourcing sometimes threatens these values, it does not always do
so. Indeed, the very fact of privatization may actually create some
interesting and surprising spaces where public law values may be protected,
and perhaps even expanded.
In all of this analysis, it should be emphasized that the law in action
matters just as much as, if not more than, the law on the books. Of course,
if State Department officials can plausibly argue that federal laws do not
give U.S. federal courts jurisdiction to try State Department contractors for
crimes they commit overseas, Congress should enact new legislation to
47
make it clear that those contractors are indeed subject to U.S. criminal law.
47. As noted above, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act gives federal courts
the power to hear criminal cases involving contractors from agencies other than the DoD if
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But the institutional and organizational arrangements to ensure that those
laws are enforced – the ability of Congress to scrutinize the Department of
Justice, the expertise and incentives of the lawyers within the Department
of Justice, and the ability of the Department of Justice to gather evidence
overseas – are just as significant as the formal legal rules. Indeed, the
intangible norms of a particular organization’s culture – as the uniformed
judge advocates’ commitment to the principle that the use of force is
limited during armed conflict powerfully attests – are perhaps the most
significant factor of all. We need to bring to the surface these often hidden
and intangible elements in responding to the particular challenges that arise
from foreign affairs privatization.
Privatization in the international realm is a crucial field of study, and it
is essential that we have more dialogue like this one among international
and domestic scholars, advocates, and policy-makers concerning
appropriate responses to this trend. And more attention must be paid to
finding a variety of mechanisms to constrain contractor malfeasance and
hold private actors more accountable both to those affected by their
activities and to those footing the bill. In the coming years we shall need to
think broadly about how best to respond to the threats posed by the
outsourcing of governmental functions to private entities. Only through
such efforts will we be able to find ways to protect crucial public law values
in the era of privatization that is already upon us.

their employment “relates to supporting a Department of Defense mission.” 18 U.S.C.
§3267(1)(A)(II)(ii) (2006).

